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TO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

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FOR AMBASSADOR ARMSTRONG FROM SONNENFELDT

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y(SUBJECT LINE OMITTED)

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS:PFOR, US, UK

SUBJECT: UK AMBASSADOR RAMSBOTHAM'S MARCH 4 MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY, AND SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS WITH COUNSELOR SONNENFELDT.

1. RAMSBOTHAM MET (AT HIS REQUEST) WITH THE SECRETARY ON MARCH 4 FOR DISCUSSION FOCUSING ON THE GREENHILL MISSION TO RHODESIA AND SOUTHERN AFRICA IN GENERAL. THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE SPECIALTY STEEL PROBLEM WERE ALSO COVERED IN THE HALF-HOUR MEETING.

2. MIDDLE EAST. SIR PETER NOTED HMG CONCERN OVER REPORTS THAT THE SYRIANS MAY PRESS FOR A RESOLUTION UNDER THE "UNITING FOR PEACE" PROCEDURE IN THE UN RELATED TO UNDOF RENEWAL, AND THAT WE MAY END UP FACING THE SAME SORT OF
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THING THAT WE DID DURING THE RECENT UN SC DEBATE AS A RE-

SULT.

ON THE QUESTION OF THE PROCEDURAL MANAGEMENT OF THE PROBLEM OF PLO PARTICIPATION IN ANY RENEWED NEGOTIATIONS, HMG WANTED TO OFFER US THE BENEFIT OF THEIR EXPERIENCE IN THE EURO-ARAB DIALOGUE: THERE WAS A COMMON ARAB DELEGATION THAT INCLUDED THE PLO, BUT WITHOUT NAMEPLATES. ANOTHER IDEA THAT MIGHT BE OF HELP IS TO HAVE "ALTERNATIVE" NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS ONE DAY AND THE ARABS THE NEXT. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO

SELL EITHER OF THESE CONCEPTS TO THE ISRAELIS, BUT THAT WE APPRECIATED THEM NONETHELESS. HE SAID HE WOULD PREFER TO WAIT AND SEE, HOWEVER, WHAT HAPPENS WITH THE US TERRITORIAL INITIATIVE IN THE NEXT THREE TO FOUR WEEKS.

3. SOUTHERN AFRICA. RAMSBOTHAM MENTIONED REPORTS THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS MIGHT TRY AND INFLICT A DEFEAT ON THE CUBANS BEFORE WITHDRAWING FROM ANGOLA. HE SAID THAT HMG MAY NEED OR PRESSURE. IF THE QUESTION OF SOUTH AFRICAN WITHDRAWAL COMES UP IN THE UN SC, IT MAY LEAD TO A CHAPTER SEVEN RESOLUTION WHICH HE WAS INSTRUCTED TO TELL US HMG COULD NOT VETO.

ON RHODESIA, SIR PETER OUTLINED THE RESULTS OF GREENHILL'S MISSION. GREENHILL WAS SENT TO SEE IF THE SITUATION HAD REACHED THE POINT WHERE HMG SHOULD INTERVENE. HE HAD A COUPLE OF HOURS WITH BUSINESSMEN, A PRIVATE SESSION WITH THE DEFENSE CHIEFS, AND MET ALONE, SEPARATELY THE NEXT DAY WITH SMITH AND NKOMO. GREENHILL MADE THREE BASIC POINTS TO SMITH: (1) THAT BRITAIN WOULD NOT ENTER INTO ANY BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH SMITH ALONE ON A CONSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT--THE ANC WOULD HAVE TO BE INVOLVED; (2) IF HMG DID BECOME INVOLVED, IT WOULD BE ONLY ON THE FIRM PRIOR UNDERSTANDING THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD NOT BE LONG AND DRAWN OUT; (3) IF RHODESIA WERE FACED WITH A SERIOUS GUERRILLA INVASION, THERE WAS NO PROSPECT AT ALL OF BRITAIN, LET ALONE ANY OTHER WESTERN POWER, INTERVENING TO HELP MAINTAIN WHITE SUPREMACY.

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IN RESPONSE TO GREENHILL'S QUESTION ABOUT THE SITUATION THAT WOULD FACE HIM FOLLOWING A COLLAPSE OF HIS TALKS WITH NKOMO, SMITH SAID HE HAD CONFIDENCE IN HIS DEFENSE FORCES SHORT OF SOVIET/CUBAN INTERVENTION ON AN ANGOLAN SCALE. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE WEST WOULD HAVE NO TRUCK WITH HIM. ON THE QUESTION OF CONCESSIONS TO AFRICAN DEMAND FOR AN EARLY TRANSITION TO MAJORITY RULE, GREENHILL LEFT HOPING THAT SMITH WOULD ACCEPT MAJORITY RULE WITHIN THREE YEARS

ALTHOUGH SMITH WOULD NOT ADMIT THIS POINT IN AS MANY WORDS (RAMSBOTHAM NOTED FONSEC CALLAGHAN'S CONTINUED SKEPTICISM ON THIS POINT). SMITH HIGHLIGHTED THE PROBLEMS OF EUROPEAN (I.E. WHITE SETTLER) CONFIDENCE, WHICH COULD COLLAPSE QUICKLY, AND THE PROBLEM OF NKOMO'S UNREPRESENTATIVENESS. AS TO BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN THE QUEST FOR A SETTLEMENT, SMITH URGED THAT HMG DO SOMETHING ABOUT THE PROBLEM OF EUROPEAN CONFIDENCE, AND ASKED IF BRITAIN COULD "ARBITRATE" BETWEEN HIM AND THE AFRICANS (WHICH GREENHILL TOOK TO MEAN CONCILIATE). GREENHILL LEFT WITH THE CONCLUSION THAT THE SMITH/NKOMO TALKS HAVE REACHED A DEAD END.

THE SECRETARY SAID WE WOULD BE SYMPATHETIC TO WHATEVER CALLAGHAN DECIDES TO DO NEXT. HE MENTIONED THE STATEMENT HE HAD MADE ON RHODESIA THE SAME DAY IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION AT A HIRC HEARING.

THE SECRETARY SAID THAT WE WILL NOT ACCEPT ANY MORE CUBAN INTERVENTION. THE CONSEQUENCES FOR AFRICA (AND SOUTH AMERICA) OF A VICTORIOUS CUBAN ARMY WILL BE EXTREMELY SERIOUS. WE CANNOT HAVE A CUBAN ARMY MARCHING ALL OVER AFRICA. A CUBAN INVASION OF RHODESIA CANNOT BE CONSIDERED IN TERMS OF THE MORALITY OF MAJORITY OR MINORITY RULE IN THAT CASE, BUT MUST BE SEEN IN THE LIGHT OF ITS EFFECTS ON THE REST OF SOUTHERN AFRICA.

THE SECRETARY AGREED WITH RAMSBOTHAM THAT OUR RESPECTIVE AFRICAN EXPERTS SHOULD STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH ON THE SITUATION.

4. SPECIALTY STEEL. SIR PETER BRIEFLY MENTIONED THE SPECIALTY STEEL PROBLEM AT THE CLOSE OF THE MEETING. HMG HAD RESISTED, HE SAID, THESE PROTECTIONIST PRESSURES IN
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BRITAIN'S DIFFICULT (ECONOMIC) CIRCUMSTANCES. FOR EXAMPLE, IMPORT PENETRATION IN THE UK AUTOMOBILE MARKET WAS ABOUT TWICE THAT OF THE US MARKET. HE HOPED IN SUM THAT THE USG COULD AVOID ACTIONS ON SPECIALTY STEEL THAT MIGHT CONTRIBUTE TO AN OVERALL PROTECTIONIST CLIMATE. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT WE ARE SYMPATHETIC, BUT THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO TAKE SOME ACTION ON THE ITC REPORT, OTHERWISE THE

CONGRESS WILL.

5. ON SUNDAY, MARCH 7, RAMSBOTHAM CALLED COUNSELOR SONNENFELDT TO CONVEY CALLAGHAN'S INITIAL REACTIONS TO RAMSBOTHAM'S MARCH 4 TALK WITH THE SECRETARY. CALLAGHAN, RAMSBOTHAM SAID, WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT WE SHOULD ALL THINK HOW WE CAN AVOID PUTTING OURSELVES ON THE WRONG

SIDE IN SOUTH AFRICA. HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS BUT WAS ACUTELY CONSCIOUS OF THE DILEMMA SHOULD OUR ACTIONS APPEAR TO BE BOLSTERING UP THE WHITE REGIMES. CALLAGHAN FELT THAT AFRICAN OPPOSITION TO US WOULD CERTAINLY OVERCOME THEIR INSTINCTIVE SUPPORT FOR OUR UNDERLINING ANTI-COMMUNIST AIM.

6. ON MARCH 16, SONNENFELDT CALLED IN RAMSBOTHAM TO INFORM HIM THAT THE SECRETARY, IN LIGHT OF SOUTH AFRICA'S DECISION TO WITHDRAW THE BULK OF ITS FORCES FROM ANGOLA AND CERTAIN INDICATIONS THAT THEY WOULD WITHDRAW TOTALLY PRIOR TO ANY SECURITY COUNCIL DECISION ON THE SUBJECT, HAD CONCLUDED THAT A U.S. DEMARCHE TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS URGING THEIR WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE AN UNNECESSARY EXPENDITURE OF WHAT LIMITED DIPLOMATIC CAPITAL THE USG POSSESSES IN PRETORIA.

7. CONCERNING RHODESIA AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL CONSIDERATION OF MOZAMBIQUE OFFSET, SONNENFELDT SAID THAT ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHAUFELLE WAS IN NEW YORK TO MEET WITH MOZAMBIQUE FOREIGN MINISTER CHISSANO. IN HIS MEETING WITH CHISSANO, SCHAUFELLE WOULD REFER TO A CONVERSATION WHICH CHISSANO HAD RECENTLY HAD WITH OUR CHARGE IN MAPUTO IN WHICH CHISSANO HAD STATED THAT THERE ARE CURRENTLY NO FOREIGN TROOPS IN RHODESIA, THAT HE DID NOT ENVISAGE THERE BEING ANY IN THE FUTURE, THAT THE
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GOVERNMENT OF MOZAMBIQUE DID NOT WANT ANOTHER ANGOLA IN AFRICA, AND THAT IT FELT THAT THE RHODESIAN PROBLEM SHOULD BE SETTLED BY THE RHODESIANS THEMSELVES. SCHAUFELLE WOULD INFORM CHISSANO THAT THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO CONSIDER SYMPATHETICALLY GRANTING ASSISTANCE TO MOZAMBIQUE, DIRECTLY OR THROUGH THE UN, TO HELP OFFSET THE COST TO MOZAMBIQUE OF ENFORCING SANCTIONS SO LONG AS THE MOZAMBIQUE POSITION AS CITED BY CHISSANO TO OUR CHARGE DOES NOT CHANGE.

8. SONNENFELDT NOTED THAT SCHAUFELLE OR USUN WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH THE UK MISSION TO INFORM THEM OF THIS CONVERSATION. WE WOULD ALSO BE SUGGESTING THAT THE UK AND OTHER EC MEMBERS OFFER AID TO MOZAMBIQUE ON A SIMILAR BASIS, THAT IS CONDITIONAL UPON MOZAMBIQUE'S CONTINUED ADHERENCE TO THE ABOVE STATED POLICIES. RAMSBOTHAM NOTED THAT THE UK HAD RECEIVED SIMILAR ASSURANCES FROM MOZAMBIQUE. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT THE UK HAD ALREADY COMMITTED ITSELF ON AID AND COULD NOT THEREFORE NOW MAKE IT CONDITIONAL. SONNENFELDT SUGGESTED THAT THE UK COULD PERHAPS FIND SOME OPPORTUNITY TO INDICATE TO MOZAMBIQUE THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THEIR AID PROGRAM WOULD DEPEND ON MOZAMBIQUE'S

ADHERENCE TO THE POLICIES THEY HAD OUTLINED. KISSINGER

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